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COMMENTS
MEDICINE GOES MADISON AVENUE: AN EVALUA-
TION OF THE EFFECT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
PHARMACEUTICAL ADVERTISING ON THE LEARNED
INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology touches virtually every aspect of American life.
Perhaps nowhere have the benefits of technological advances and
development been felt more profoundly than the delivery of health
care. Many diseases and problems virtually without treatment
twenty years ago, today are remedied with routine procedures and
therapies. Cardiac surgery, chemotherapy, and childhood vac-
cinations are typical of recent medical advancements.
The advances in treatment have been accompanied by signifi-
cant increases in the cost of heath care. It is estimated that in
1996, Americans spent more than $1 trillion on health care prod-
ucts and services.' Health care is the single largest business in
the United States, representing 14% of the gross domestic prod-
uct.2 Health care expenses comprise the largest single area of
non-government spending.3
Corresponding with the financial burdens attendant to our
modern health care system, a fundamental change has taken
place in the way Americans pay for their health care.4 It is no
longer customary for an individual to take personal financial
responsibility for the cost of such care.5 The majority of Ameri-
1. Beso Sikharulidze, Product Innovation, Demographic Trends Continue to
Push the Health Care Sector Ahead, SELECT UPDATE, (FIDELITY DIST. CORP.,
BOSTON, MASS.), Summer 1997, at 3 (on file in the Law Review Office).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Julie Rovner, United States of America: The Healthcare System Evolves,
LANCET, Oct. 12, 1996, at 1001.
5. Kevin Dunne & Ciara Ryan, How Management of Medical Costs is
Revolutionizing the Drug Industry, Defense Council J., Apr. 1995, at 177.
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cans now depend upon payment of health care costs by a variety of
third party providers, including private insurance programs and
various state and federal entitlement programs.6
These fundamental changes have drastically altered the
delivery of health care services. In an attempt to minimize the
escalation of costs, "managed care", a heretofore unknown concept
emerged. Health care providers, insurers and manufacturers
began to actively compete to attempt to optimize services and out-
comes while minimizing costs. Such competition has produced
both welcome and unwelcome changes. The annual percentage
increase in total health benefit costs declined to 2.1% in 1996,
down from the late 1980's when health care inflation reached
levels of 19%.7
The economic shift from an individually funded health care
delivery system to a system funded by institutions has profoundly
affected the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry. Manufac-
turers increasingly find it necessary to compete for representation
and placement on formularies maintained by hospitals, insurers
and Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs).s PBMs attempt to min-
imize prescription drug costs by negotiation with suppliers in
exchange for agreements to purchase specific medications utilized
by the group members.9
As manufacturers attempt to appropriately position their
products in the chain of delivery, new techniques are often
employed to supplement traditional marketing efforts which have
historically consisted of direct physician education, information
provided in medical references, educational seminars, and
research grants.' The pharmaceutical industry is responding to
these challenges through vertical integration. Many U.S. phar-
maceutical manufacturers have recently purchased PBMs 11 and
created alliances with insurers, health maintenance organiza-
tions, and various health care providers.
6. Rovner, supra note 4, at 1001.
7. Sikharulidze, supra note 1, at 1.
8. Dunne, supra note 5, at 180.
9. Id. at 178.
10. Id. at 200.
11. See Anita McGahan, Industry Structure and Competitive Advantage,
HARv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 115. Merck & Co., the largest U.S.
pharmaceutical manufacturer, purchased Medco, a leading PBM for $6.6 Billion;
Smithkline Beecham purchased another PBM, Diversified Pharmacutical
Services, for $2.3 Billion. Id.
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Among the most controversial of the new marketing tech-
niques employed by pharmaceutical manufacturers is direct-to-
consumer prescription advertising in a variety of formats and
media. Pharmaceutical remedies for varied problems such as
allergies, nail fungus, hypertension, hair loss, and depression are
placed directly before the consumer in magazines, television, and
via the Internet. 2 The utilization of direct consumer marketing
raises questions and issues addressing manufacturer liability for
failure to adequately warn of risks possibly associated with phar-
maceutical use. In the past five years, reports indicate that phar-
maceutical companies have spent over $1 billion on direct-to-
consumer ads. 13 John Kamp, senior vice-president of the Ameri-
can Association of Advertising Agencies, has predicted that
annual expenditures would top $1.2 billion dollars if the Food and
Drug Administration relaxed its consumer advertising policies.
14
On August 8, 1997 the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) in
fact announced proposed guidelines that allow a drug manufac-
turer for the first time to explicitly state its product's purpose in a
direct-to-consumer radio or television advertisement.' 5 Michael J.
Friedman, lead FDA Commissioner, characterizes the new regula-
tions as an attempt to "promote greater consumer awareness
about prescription drugs .... 16
The new guidelines, which address advertisements on televi-
sion and radio, require manufacturers to include information
about major risks of the product and to provide more detailed
information by a toll-free telephone number, Internet site or read-
ily available brochure. 1 7 Nevertheless, consumer groups are con-
cerned about the ultimate effect of such advertisements. Sidney
M. Wolfe, executive director of Public Citizen's Health Research
Group, warns that "misleading information can injure and kill.'
The established medical community also has expressed con-
cerns about the use of direct-to-consumer marketing activities.
Susan Winckler, director of policy and legislation for the Ameri-
can Pharmaceutical Association cautions that product-specific ads
12. Michael F. Conlan, In-Your-Face Pharmacy: Will the Boom in Rx Ads
Aimed at Consumers Continue?, DRUG Topics, July 8, 1996, at 92.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. FDA Eases Rules for Televised Drug Ads, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), August 9, 1997, at 1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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can create a challenge for both the prescriber and the pharma-
cist.19 The American Medical Association (AMA) has long main-
tained a policy in opposition to product-specific prescription ads
aimed at consumers.20 A 1992 study by the Annals of Internal
Medicine reports that a peer review of 109 prescription ads found
92 per cent of the advertisements lacking in some manner.21 Nev-
ertheless, Joseph Cranston, director of AMA's drug policy depart-
ment noted that due to "the thrust on patient empowerment and
the consumer's zeal for as much information as possible about
health care, including the medications that they take, it's kind of
academic. "22
Direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceuticals has also
attracted the attention of the legal community. Numerous courts
and authors have considered the impact of such activities on a
manufacturer's potential liability,23 concluding that products lia-
bility doctrines can and must adapt to changes in society's meth-
ods and practices. The California Supreme Court, for example,
noted that "[tihe manufacturer's obligation to the consumer must
keep pace with the changing relationship between them .... 24
One area specifically affected is the commonly accepted doc-
trine of the learned intermediary. The learned intermediary doc-
trine dictates that a pharmaceutical manufacturer's duty to warn
the ultimate consumer is satisfied by an accurate and adequate
warning to the prescribing physician.25 Suggestions have been
made that direct patient marketing is designed to form "consumer
preferences", thus undermining the concept of the learned inter-
mediary.2 6 Most recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine existed in a case
involving prescription nicotine patches.
This comment will attempt to examine and evaluate the
learned intermediary doctrine in light of the recent explosion in
19. Conlan, supra note 12, at 94.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 208, 211, n.4 (D. Mass. 1991),
rev'd. on other grounds, 967 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1992); Teresa M. Schwartz,
Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the Learned Intermediary
Rule, 46 FooD & DRUG COSM. L.J. 829 (1991).
24. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944).
25. Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1992).
26. Dunne, supra note 5, at 195.
27. Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997).
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direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical products, focus-
ing on an analysis of product liability principles, including com-
ments from the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, as they
apply to this subject. This comment will examine the potential
ramification of FDA consumer advertising requirements, espe-
cially as they relate to potential additional exceptions to the
learned intermediary doctrine. This analysis will support the con-
clusion that the learned intermediary doctrine remains functional
and provides the consumer with the best available alternative to
ensure the most appropriate use of safe and effective
pharmaceuticals.
II. PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY ASSOCIATED WITH
MANUFACTURER'S DUTY To WARN OF RISKS
A. General Principles of Product Liability for Failure to Warn
A manufacturer's potential liability for failure to warn is gen-
erally based upon either traditional negligence theory (alleging a
breach of a duty to warn of risks) or strict liability.2" Instructions
and warnings serve two main functions: to enable consumers to
minimize risks through proper use of a product and to allow con-
sumers the opportunity to make informed decisions regarding the
choice to encounter risks associated with a product which cannot
be eliminated.2 9 Warnings associated with pharmaceuticals pri-
marily impact the decision whether to encounter the risk at all, as
pharmaceutical warnings provided directly to a consumer would
have little or no impact on a patient's ability to reduce potential
risk by adherence to the warnings.
Pharmaceutical manufacturer liability has been a difficult
area of product liability jurisprudence. 0 Attempts to balance the
risk versus rewards of pharmaceutical products are exceedingly
complex. The majority of jurisdictions, including those who have
adopted the strict liability position of Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A,31 refuse to impose strict liability on manufacturers
and distributors of pharmaceuticals. 2 The reluctance to impose
28. W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 95A, at 678 (5th ed. 1984).
29. Id. § 96 at 685.
30. Teresa M. Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement
(Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357 (1994).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
32. See Grundberg v. Upjohn, Co., 813 P.2d 89, 98 (Utah 1991) (concluding
that "a broad grant of immunity from strict liability claims based on design
19971 117
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such liability is often based upon a recognition of the public bene-
fits provided by the availability of pharmaceuticals,33 as well as
comment k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which
states:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended use. These are especially common in the field of drugs
.... The seller of such drugs, again with the qualification that
they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is
given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict
liability... merely because he has undertaken to supply the pub-
lic with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with
a known but apparently reasonable risk.34
Courts have also specifically declined to apply the product lia-
bility theories of express and implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability to prescription drugs. 31 Such theories, represent-
ing a blend of tort and contract concepts are poorly fitted to pre-
scription liability issues. The majority of jurisdictions require
reliance upon the warranty in order to impose manufacturer lia-
bility.36 Prescription consumer reliance is more appropriately
placed upon the medical judgment of the physician, rather than
"warranties" allegedly conveyed by the manufacturer.3 7
Courts have also declined to impose Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) implied warranties of fitness and merchantablility
to prescription drugs. This issue was well stated by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, rejecting a claim based upon the
U.C.C. (codified at N.C.G.S. § 25-2-314), noting "[t]o say that the
issuance of a prescription for drugs, which prescription is to be
filled by a pharmacist should the patient desire to follow the phy-
sician's suggestion, constitutes the transfer of title to the drugs in
the formula in the prescription, is simply too unrealistic for seri-
defects should be extended to FDA-approved prescription drugs .... ."); Coyle v.
Richardson-Merrell Inc., 584 A.2d. 1383 (Pa. 1991) (declining to extend strict
liability to sellers of pharmaceuticals).
33. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
35. Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1967) aff'd., 250 A.2d 129 (N.J.
1969); Cheshire v. Southhampton Hosp. Ass'n, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1967); Foster v.
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n of Charleston, 219 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1975).
36. 63 AM. Jur. 2D Products Liability § 455 (1984).
37. Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Co., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1288 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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ous consideration."38  Other jurisdictions have agreed that the
prescribing of a medication is a component of the delivery of medi-
cal services, rather than the delivery of a product subject to
implied U.C.C. warranties.3 9
Therefore, potential pharmaceutical manufacturer liability
for failure to warn would generally have to be determined in
accordance with ordinary negligence principles. 40 The inquiry
into pharmaceutical manufacturer warnings generally focuses on
two issues; (1) the adequacy of the warnings and (2) to whom the
warnings should be made.41 An analysis of the adequacy of the
warning is beyond the scope of this comment and has generated
significant litigation in many jurisdictions.42 The central issue
germane to this inquiry is to whom the warning should be given:
health care professional or consumer.
B. Rationale and Development of the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine
Drugs dispensed pursuant to a prescription generally carry no
manufacturer's warnings to the ultimate consumer, with the
exception of oral contraceptives and nicotine patches.43 This is
because of a unique aspect of prescription drug product liability
cases: the concept of the prescribing physician as "learned inter-
mediary" who makes an informed, unbiased, and educated deci-
sion concerning the appropriateness of medication selection. The
doctrine emerged in the mid 1960's, recognizing that a pharma-
ceutical manufacturer's duty to warn is discharged by conveying
necessary warnings to physicians. The term "learned intermedi-
ary" apparently originated in an opinion from the Eight Circuit
Court of Appeals, describing a patient's doctor as a "learned inter-
38. Batiste v. American Home Prod. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 1, 6, 231 S.E.2d 269,
272 (1977).
39. Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d. 247 (Cal. 1985); Ellsroth v.
Johnson & Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Coyle v. Richardson-
Merrill, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1991).
40. Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984); Johnson v.
American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324 (Kan. 1986).
41. See Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer or Seller for
Injury or Death Allegedly Caused by Failure to Warn Regarding Danger in Use of
Vaccine or Prescription Drug, 94 A.L.R.3d 748 (1997).
42. Id.
43. FDA regulations require manufacturer warnings to accompany these
products. See infra text accompanying notes 55-65. See 21 C.F.R. § 310.501(a)
(1986); Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 301 (Okla. 1997).
1997]
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mediary" between the manufacturer and the consumer.44 The
majority of jurisdictions have adopted this concept and absolve a
manufacturer from any requirement to directly warn the patient
when the prescribing physician has been adequately warned.45
The learned intermediary doctrine is based upon a number of
factors including: (1) the physician's training and experience; (2)
the physician's evaluation of the patient's needs and wishes; (3)
the assumption that the physician is better situated than the
manufacturer to convey the appropriate and applicable warnings
to the ultimate user; (4) the fact that warnings to consumers
might interfere with the traditional physician-patient relation-
ship; and (5) the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible to convey
appropriate warnings to the consumer, given the highly technical
nature of the information and the variations in needs based upon
individual patient characteristics.4 6
The learned intermediary doctrine recognizes that the patient
generally relies upon the physician, not the manufacturer, to
ensure the appropriate selection and use of pharmaceuticals.4 7
Physician failure to evaluate and communicate the appropriate
warnings supplied by the manufacturer to the patient may rea-
sonably result in patient injury as a proximate result of such fail-
ure. However, in such cases alleging manufacturer liability, the
physician's failure is often viewed as a superseding cause of the
patient's injury.4- A number of jurisdictions have however, main-
tained manufacturer liability in conjunction with prescriber negli-
gence, when it can be shown that the manufacturer's warnings to
the prescribing physician were in fact inadequate.49
44. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
45. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Hoffman v.
Sterling Drug Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 142 (3rd Cir. 1973); Magee v. Wyeth, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 322 (1963); Ortho Pharm. Co. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. 1979);
Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 210 S.E.2d 289 (1974) (ruling that
pharmaceutical manufacturer was required to provide warnings to the medical
profession); Terhune v. A.H. Robins, 577 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1978).
46. Schwartz, supra note 23.
47. Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Co., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1288 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
48. Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 577 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Mulder v.
Parke Davis & Co., 181 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1970).
49. McCue v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 453 F.2d 1033 (1st Cir. 1972) (applying
New Hampshire law); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir.
1970); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966); Stevens v.
Parke Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973); Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183,
(Cal. App. 1964); Bine v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1968).
120 [Vol. 20:113
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
considered the issue of appropriate warnings of risks associated
with prescription drugs in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow,50 a case
involving the adequacy of warnings conveyed to a physician con-
cerning potential side effects of chloroquine phosphate. The court
applied a negligence test (as would the majority of jurisdictions) in
considering the adequacy of the warnings. The Sterling court
noted that "[tihe trial court clearly applied, recognized and
expressly enunciated the undisputed standard of a duty to make
reasonable efforts to warn the medical profession of the side
effects of a drug. "51
Courts have narrowly extended the doctrine of the learned
intermediary to require warnings to other selected health care
providers. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has extended the
duty of a manufacturer to include a duty to warn a nurse anesthe-
siologist practicing under the supervision of the attending physi-
cian anesthesiologist.5 2 The court cited with approval the
proposition that warnings are only required to be given to mem-
bers of the medical profession responsible for the patient's care. 53
The use of the term "only" reasonably leads to the conclusion that
the duty to warn does not extend to the patient, recognizing that
the appropriate medical professionals are responsible for gather-
ing information, evaluating the risks, and ultimately making the
appropriate pharmacological selection. This narrow extension of
the duty to warn is entirely consistent with the principles of the
learned intermediary doctrine.54
Because of the learned intermediary doctrine, as a general
rule, a patient cannot sue the manufacturer for a failure to warn if
the medical profession was adequately warned. Cases such as
Holley and Hoffman demonstrate that the particular members of
the medical profession that are to receive the warnings may
expand to reflect changes in healthcare delivery.
50. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
51. Id. at 991 (emphasis added).
52. Holley v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 74 N.C. App. 736, 330 S.E.2d 228
(1985), affd., 318 N.C. 352, 348 S.E.2d 772 (1986).
. 53. Id. at 747 (citing Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 210 S.E.2d 289
(1974)).
54. See also Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973) (The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also narrowly extended the
duty to warn, noting that the manufacturer had a duty to warn treating, as well
as prescribing physicians.).
1997]
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C. Exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Specific exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine have
been recognized, resulting in a duty to warn patients directly,
when (1) mass immunizations are given without the traditional
physician involvement5 5 and (2) where regulations require that
adequate warnings be given to the ultimate user (oral contracep-
tives and more recently nicotine patches). 6 The rationale behind
the mass immunization exception is that the traditional physi-
cian-patient relationship is altered in such a manner that the
patient no longer benefits from the physician's diagnostic skills
and judgement. During mass immunizations (military, schools,
health departments, etc.), the patient is often not individually
evaluated by a physician. As such, the physician, if present at all,
acts only to oversee the administration and therefore fails to act in
the capacity of a learned intermediary who would advise and pro-
tect the patient individually. 57
Several states have also recognized an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine in cases involving medications for
which the Food and Drug Administration requires direct-to-con-
sumer warnings.5 8 Although courts have not been uniform in rec-
ognition of this exception, this issue is particularly interesting in
light of the recent FDA policy on direct-to-consumer advertising.59
To date, courts have applied this exception to FDA requirements
for consumer warnings associated with oral contraceptives, nico-
tine patches and non-therapeutic medical devices such as breast
implants and intrauterine devices.6 °
Courts recognizing the learned intermediary exception based
on FDA required warnings have noted that the traditional physi-
cian-patient relationship is often altered, much like the cases
55. Davis v. Wyeth Labs., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs.,
498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Givens v. Lederle Labs., 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir.
1977).
56. Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997); Odgers v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
57. Dunne, supra note 5, at 177.
58. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985); Odgers,
609 F. Supp. 867; Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D.
Wis.), amended by 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
59. Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Allen
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989).
60. Edwards, 933 P.2d at 301; Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir.
1989).
[Vol. 20:113122
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involving mass immunizations.6 1 Much of the litigation involving
this exception has involved the prescribing of oral contraceptives.
Courts have noted that the decision to use birth control medica-
tion frequently involves increased patient input into the decision,
as well as less involvement by the physician in monitoring the use
of the medication. 62 Courts have also commented on other factors,
including the fact that oral contraceptives are often advertised
directly to consumers, the products are typically not used for ther-
apeutic reasons, and the products often involve serious side
effects. 63 Additionally, courts have noted that the FDA requires
patient warnings regarding side effects to accompany the dispens-
ing of the product.64 Courts recognizing the duty to directly warn
the consumer have also struggled with questions concerning the
adequacy of the warnings.6 5
III. EFFECTS OF DIRECT-To-CONSUMER PHARMACEUTICAL
ADVERTISEMENTS
Many of the rationales and factors suggested by courts in
opinions declining to recognize the learned intermediary doctrine
have likewise been suggested as being applicable to cases involv-
ing direct-to-consumer advertisements.66 Arguments have been
advanced that the advertisements may alter the patient-physician
relationship and subsequently affect the judgment of the prescrib-
ing physician.67 In addition to the requirement to warn associated
with the delivery or dispensing of certain medications, 68 legisla-
tion exists which addresses the duty to warn in advertisements for
prescription drugs. The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
requires that all print advertisements for prescription drugs con-
tain information in "brief summary" relating to side effects, con-
traindications, and effectiveness. 69 Regulations further require
61. Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D.Mich. 1985); Odgers
v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Lukaszewicz, 510 F.
Supp. 961.
62. Hill, 884 F.2d at 1071.
63. Stephens, 602 F. Supp. at 380-81 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
64. 21 C.F.R. § 310.501(a) (1986).
65. As previously noted, analysis of adequacy of warnings is beyond the scope
of this comment; See Fairchild, supra note 42.
66. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 842
67. Id. at 839.
68. See supra note 43.
69. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1997).
1997]
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that the "brief summary" disclose all risk-related information con-
tained in a product's approved package labeling.7"
In contrast to the "brief summary" requirement for print
advertisements, the newly articulated FDA guidance addressing
advertisements through broadcast media (radio, television and
telephone communications) modifies the requirement to an "ade-
quate provision" standard.7 ' All such prescription advertisements
must include information about the major risks in either audio or
audio and visual parts of the presentation. 72 A sponsor may pro-
vide a "major statement" of major risks along with an "adequate
provision" for the delivery of the approved package labeling in con-
nection with the broadcast presentation.73
This alternative recognizes the difficulty associated with
delivery of the "brief summary" statement in broadcast media.
The proposed guidance encourages "product sponsors to provide
consumers with non-promotional, consumer-friendly information
that is consistent with approved product labeling, in addition to
the information currently required by the regulations .... The
purpose of the draft guidance is to "provide consumers with ade-
quate communication of the required risk information, while facil-
itating the process used by sponsors to advertise their products to
consumers."75 The proposals set forth are not binding on the FDA
or the manufacturers, as they are offered only as guidance, but
one would expect that the recommendations will quickly become
standard industry practice.
What will be the effect of such recommendations on the
learned intermediary doctrine? Will or should the courts extend
the exceptions often recognized for oral contraceptives and nico-
tine patches to the issue of direct-to-consumer advertised products
in light of mandates and recommendations to provide such warn-
ings with advertisements? Several court decisions indicate that
direct-to-consumer advertising is indeed a factor in application of
the learned intermediary doctrine. 76 The newly revised Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts discusses these concerns, stating:
70. § 352(n).
71. Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Direct Broadcast Advertisements,
62 Fed. Reg. 43,171 (1997).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 43,172.
75. Id.
76. Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Arkansas law);
Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 208, 211 n.4 (D. Mass. 1991), rev'd on
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[A]rguments have been advanced that in two other areas courts
should consider imposing tort liability on drug manufacturers who
fail to provide direct warnings to consumers. In the first,... gov-
ernmental regulatory agencies have mandated that patients be
informed .... In the second, manufacturers have advertised a
prescription drug and its intended use in the mass media.
77
A critical examination of the potential ramifications of direct-
to-consumer advertising and direct-to-consumer warnings is
appropriate in analyzing suggestions for an additional exception
to the learned intermediary doctrine based on direct-to-consumer
advertisements.
A. Potential Effect of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising on the
Physician-Patient Relationship
It has been suggested that direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical
advertising may negatively interfere with the critical relationship
between a physician and his or her patient.78 To the contrary, any
potential change in this relationship attendant to consumer
advertising is beneficial, rather than negative.
The practice of medicine is a noble profession based upon the
ideals of learning and service to fellow man. By virtue of the phy-
sician's extensive training and abilities, he or she is placed in a
unique position accompanied by immense responsibility. No other
member of society is similarly situated as an evaluator and advi-
sor of treatment for illnesses, including the evaluation of the com-
plex, confusing array of medications currently available. "[O]nly
health care professionals are in a position to understand the sig-
nificance of the risks involved and to assess the relative advan-
tages and disadvantages of a given form of prescription-based
therapy."79
The patient-physician relationship has historically been
granted special protection under the law.80 Courts and regulatory
authorities have closely scrutinized activities which might inap-
propriately interfere with physician objectivity. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that "[a]
other grounds, 976 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying Massachusetts law);
Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (applying
Michigan law).
77. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS § 8 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
78. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 839.
79. RESTATEMENT (THIMD) OF TORTS § 8 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
80. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
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manufacturer of an ethical drug must exercise reasonable care,
commensurate with the risk, to warn physicians effectively of the
drug's inherent dangers."81 The Salmon court, considering a negli-
gence action against a pharmaceutical manufacturer for failure to
adequately warn a physician, concluded that evidence of potential
over-promotion of the product precluded summary judgment for
the manufacturer.8 2 The Salmon court stated that the alleged
over-promotion may have eroded the effectiveness of the warnings
supplied by the manufacturer.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has likewise discussed
the importance of the medical professional's objectivity in the
selection and use of prescription drugs. In Whitley v Cubberlys3
the court commented:
That [defendant] may have fully complied with all applicable Fed-
eral laws in its marketing and labeling... would not in itself free
it of liability for harm caused by use of the drug if it were shown
that such use and resulting harm was caused by the Company's
negligent acts in over-promoting the drug .... For example, even
though all warnings required by Federal authorities may have
been given, such warnings would be insufficient to exonerate
Parke, Davis from all liability if over-promotion through a vigor-
ous sales campaign should induce the medical profession.., to fail
adequately to heed the warnings given.8 4
In Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co.,s5 the California Supreme
Court also affirmed the importance of objective physician warn-
ings." The manufacturer of an antibiotic was held liable for the
wrongful death of a patient, even though the manufacturer had
provided letters to physicians detailing side effects, including the
specific side effect resulting in the plaintiff's death. The court
stated:
We are satisfied that the evidence in the record ... support[s] the
implied finding of the jury that [the manufacturer] negligently
failed to provide an adequate warning as to the dangers of [the
antibiotic] by so "watering down" its warnings and so over-pro-
81. Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co. 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975).
82. Id.
83. Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 210 S.E.2d 289 (1974) (reversing
summary judgment verdict for the defendant manufacturer).
84. Id. at 207-08, 210 S.E.2d at 292.
85. 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973).
86. Id.
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moting such drug that members of the medical profession... were
caused to prescribe it when it was not justified. 7
Regulatory agencies also monitor the promotional activities of
pharmaceutical manufacturers. A 1992 study by the Office of
Evaluation and Inspections examined the promotion of
pharmaceuticals by manufacturers to physicians involving pay-
ments and gifts.88 The study recommended further delineation
and clarification of appropriate guidelines of such promotional
activities. The study also suggested a multi-disciplinary approach
to formulating rules defining the distinction between promotional
activity and scientific exchange, involving the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturer's Association, the American Medical Association,
and the Food and Drug Administration. 9
The intense level of deference afforded to the physician-
patient relationship is readily discerned. Courts, regulatory
authorities, and professional associations closely monitor the
activities surrounding the distribution of information to prescrib-
ing physicians. The goal and effect of such monitoring activities is
to ensure that the physician receives and relies upon clear, unbi-
ased, accurate information. This approach enforces the rationale
of the learned intermediary, in which the physician evaluates
complex, but unbiased information concerning appropriate phar-
macological alternatives.
B. Potential Effects of Direct-to-consumer Pharmaceutical
Advertising on Consumers
Opinions vary regarding the effect of direct pharmaceutical
advertising on consumers. A 1991 report by the General Account-
ing Office (GAO) reviewed 130 studies on prescription consumer
advertising.90 The report was critical of much of the research
done in previous studies; however the GAO did enumerate several
potential benefits including consumer education, price reduction
and patient involvement in health care. 9' The report also cau-
87. Id. at 662.
88. OFFICE OF EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS, PRESCRIPTION DRUG
PROMOTION INVOLVING PAYMENTS AND GIFTS (1992) (abstract on file in Law
Review Office).
89. Id.
90. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: LITTLE is KNOWN
ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING (1991) (abstract on
file in Law Review Office).
91. Id.
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tioned against the potential detriments of increased costs and
inadequate risk information.9 2
An analysis of the potential benefits of direct-to-consumer
pharmaceutical advertising indicates that such advertising can
often be the first source of information on newly available treat-
ments. Consumer advertising may also increase awareness of
established treatments and procedures. An example of the educa-
tional benefits of consumer advertising is the ability to trigger
consumer recognition of symptoms of various illnesses and dis-
eases. Specific examples might include information on symptoms
such as excessive thirst as a potential warning sign of diabetes
and unexplained weight loss and insomnia as potential indicators
of depression.
Direct-to-consumer advertisements may also encourage con-
sumers who may have previously discontinued treatment due to
side effects to consult the appropriate health professional concern-
ing new treatment alternatives. For example, many commonly
prescribed anti-hypertensive medications may cause impotence in
male patients often resulting in patient self-termination of treat-
ment.93 Information on the availability of potential alternative
medications with a lower incidence of side effects may encourage
such patients to seek additional treatment.94
In addition, as consumers participate in health care decisions
they are likely to be better informed and able to convey appropri-
ate information to the prescribing physician. Patients may recog-
nize important risk factors and warning signs that could
contribute to more effective and appropriate treatment, pharma-
cological or otherwise. "Consumer advertising plays an important
role in health care by making valuable medical information-such
as symptoms that should be checked out with a physician and
symptomless conditions for which at-risk groups should be
tested-readily available to consumers .... "9 Consumer adver-
tisements also enable patients to become more active partners in
the delivery of healthcare. "A properly educated, properly moti-
vated patient-partner is the best bet the physician has for getting
92. Id.
93. DRUG FACTS AND COMPARISONS, at 161b (Facts and Comparisons Inc.
1996) (on file in Law Review Office).
94. James G. Dickinson, Kessler's Marketing War Meets Resistance; David A.
Kesler, MEDICAL MARKETING & MEDIA, Feb. 1992, at 48.
95. Conlan, supra note 12, at 94 (quoting Richard Samp, Chief Legal Counsel
for the Washington Legal Foundation).
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a good outcome for the patient overall... [a]nd direct-to-consumer
ads play a part in that."96 The opportunity to convey such benefi-
cial consumer information should be encouraged, not discouraged
by the threat of increased potential manufacturer liability.
C. Difficulty of Conveying an Adequate Warning to the
Consumer
As previously suggested, the use of consumer directed adver-
tisements may contribute to a more informed consumer and hence
result in more desirable health care outcomes. It might be sug-
gested that the imposition of a legally recognized duty for manu-
factures to directly warn consumers would further facilitate these
desired outcomes. This would create an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine, which generally allows a manufacturer to
escape liability for failing to warn a consumer if the physician was
adequately warned instead. However, a close analysis of this
potential exception to the doctrine reveals several serious
obstacles.
The simple act by a physician to prescribe a medication, to
pen a few obscure words and symbols on a 4 inch x 6 inch paper,
represents the culmination of a complex process representing mul-
tiple decisions. The physician must initially correctly diagnose the
condition, then subsequently select the appropriate therapeutic
category from such options as surgery, physical therapy, counsel-
ing, prescription medications, as well as no treatment at all. If
medication use is deemed appropriate, the physician must further
select the single most appropriate drug based on a myriad of fac-
tors, many related directly to the patient's individual characteris-
tics. Factors include patient sensitivity, drug efficacy, duration of
treatment, potential for side effects, drug interactions with other
therapy the patient may be utilizing, as well as patient prefer-
ences. Patient preferences may include taste, mode of use (oral,
rectal, injection), cost, previous experience, as well as previous
exposure to consumer advertising.
All of these factors are subsequently considered in the physi-
cian's ultimate choice of medication. Thus, attempts in a direct-
to-consumer ad to adequately convey sufficient information to
enable a consumer to make a reasonably informed and educated
96. Id. at 94 (quoting Peter Seaver, Vice President for Health-Care Policy and
Professional Relations at Pharmacia & Upjohn).
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decision would be prohibitively lengthy and difficult to convey.9"
As an example, the Food and Drug Administration's mandated
physician information required for a popular oral contraceptive
contains over eight hundred lines of text.98 Additionally, serious
difficulties are present in attempting to translate the complexities
and subtleties of medical terminology into consumer useable
information.
Even assuming that adequate information could be conveyed
to effectively educate consumers of potential risks, such informa-
tion may ultimately be counterproductive. Consumers, lacking
the training and understanding to properly evaluate risks of treat-
ment as opposed to risks associated with failure to treat, may
needlessly discontinue or fail to initiate necessary treatment.
This may be particularly significant in the treatment of "silent"
conditions such as hypertension, high cholesterol, and diabetes.
D. Potential "Chilling Effect" on the Pharmaceutical Industry
Imposition of legal liability for failure to warn the consumer
of risks would likely have a "chilling effect" on the use of direct-to-
consumer advertisements. Pharmaceutical manufacturers provide
many needed products which have immensely improved the qual-
ity and duration of life. However, we must also realize that phar-
maceutical manufacturers must respond to appropriate business
concerns. Manufacturers owe a duty to owners and shareholders
to operate the business in a manner which would reflect sound
business judgment. The potential liability associated with aban-
doning the learned intermediary doctrine in advertising cases
would most assuredly minimize the use of this potentially benefi-
cial activity.
An illustrative example of the potential of this concept is the
near crisis in the childhood vaccine market in the mid 1980's.
Fearful of potential civil tort liability, the number of private phar-
maceutical companies producing the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis
97. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,020 (1979). In the 1970's, the Food and Drug
Administration conducted studies which indicated that most patients did not
receive information concerning medication from their physician, and those who
did receive information often did not understand it or forgot it before leaving the
office. Id.
98. ORTHO PHARMACEUTICAL CORP., ORTHO-CYCLEN ORTHO TRI-CYCLEN, (1994)
(on file in Law Review Office).
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(DPT) vaccine decreased from eight manufacturers to two manu-
facturers between 1980 and 1986. 99
Congress responded with the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986.1°° The statute provides a no-fault compensa-
tion scheme for injured parties, requiring the plaintiff to initially
file any potential claim with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services rather than against the manufacturer. 10 1 If an injured
party is dissatisfied with the statutory compensation award, the
Vaccine Act does allow victims to proceed under state product lia-
bility laws. However, Congress limited the available legal
theories. 10
2
The history and necessity of the Vaccine Act demonstrate the
potential impact of manufacturer liability on the availability of
pharmaceuticals. It would be reasonable to infer that imposition
of increased potential liability for products advertised directly to
consumers would likewise limit or eliminate the use of such adver-
tisements. As a result, consumers would be deprived of the
numerous potential benefits discussed previously.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Unmistakably the power of advertising can generate con-
sumer interest in and awareness of consumer products including
prescription drugs. This is evidenced by the significant growth in
sales of various medications which have been advertised directly
to consumers. 10 3 However, consumer interest alone does not
result in the actual use of any particular prescription medication.
Our current health delivery system allows only physicians to initi-
ate and facilitate the use of such medications. Although physi-
cians no doubt respond to patient requests, ideas and suggestions
concerning medication choice, it is unreasonable to assume that
any medication would be prescribed based solely or even primarily
upon patient responses to direct-to-consumer advertisements.
Certainly, it is possible that given two equally appropriate
choices, the physician may choose to prescribe a medication sug-
99. H.R. REP. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 4 (1986).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to -33 (Supp. 1986).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
102. Daniel Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and
Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 1853 (1995).
103. Marilyn L. Castaldi, FDA Writing for Tougher Rx for Pharmaceutical
Marketing, PUBLIC RELATIONS J., Aug. 1991, at 14; When the Prostate Swells,
CONSUMER REPORTS, July, 1993 at 460.
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gested by the consumer. However, the overriding physician
responsibility is to ensure that the choice of medication is thera-
peutically appropriate. Simply because a patient inquired about
an advertised product and subsequently received that product
does not suggest that the physician acted in a manner inconsis-
tent with the doctrine of the "learned intermediary". Physician
failure to adequately assess the patient's needs accompanied by a
decision on a particular course of treatment which was based
solely on a patient's requesting medication he or she had seen in a
direct solicitation would almost certainly constitute medical mal-
practice. The physician would fail to function at the "standard of
care" appropriate to his or her position in the health care system.
Any subsequent harm suffered by the patient due to this form of
professional negligence could and should be redressed by an action
directly against the physician.
The availability of effective prescription therapies is critical to
maintenance of public health. It is entirely reasonable and proper
to create a social and legal environment which encourages manu-
facturers to continue to develop life-saving and life-improving
pharmaceuticals. Certainly all parties involved, including phar-
maceutical manufacturers, want to ensure that the public health
is protected. The Food and Drug Administration is legislatively
mandated to protect the public by ensuring compliance with a
standard of safe and effective pharmaceuticals. 10 4 The proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts makes notice of the significance of
FDA regulation, stating the assumption that "governmental regu-
latory agencies adequately review new prescription drugs and
devices, keeping unreasonably dangerous devices off the
market." 0 5
Dean Prosser stated the dichotomy well:
The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous
products should make good the harm, distribute it by liability
insurance, and add the cost to the price of the product, encounters
reason for pause, when we consider that two of the greatest medi-
cal boons to the human race, penicillin and cortisone, both have
their dangerous side effects, and that drug companies might well
have been deterred from producing and selling them.'0 6
104. See the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1988).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 8 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
106. JOHN W. WADE ET. AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS at 749 (9th ed. 1994).
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Recognition of the public interest in pharmaceutical develop-
ment has led various state legislatures to adopt specific statutes
limiting product liability actions against manufacturers and sell-
ers of pharmaceuticals. 10 7 However, in the absence of legislative
direction, the doctrine of the learned intermediary still represents
the most reasonable and effective method of ensuring access to
safe and effective medications. Rather than undermining appro-
priate medication use, the increased utilization of direct-to-con-
sumer pharmaceutical advertising supports this objective.
Through increased awareness of alternatives and potential thera-
pies, consumers are better able to benefit from the knowledge and
expertise of the prescribing physician. The imposition of a legal
liability to warn consumers of potential risks associated with
advertised products, however, would force manufacturers to
reevaluate and likely decrease the utilization of this potentially
valuable form of consumer information.
Michael C. Allen
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5(c) (1996). ([N]o manufacturer or seller of a
prescription drug shall be liable for failing to provide a warning or instruction
directly to a consumer if an adequate warning or instruction has been provided to
the physician ... less the United States Food and Drug Administration requires
such direct consumer warning or instruction to accompany the product.). See
also ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (West 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 58C-4
(West 1987); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(c) (Anderson 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.927 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (1992).
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